We compare wages between school leavers who participate in government-funded youth training and those who do not. Using a subset of all school leavers in Lancashire between 1988 and 1991, we ®nd that wage differentials are large and negative for all types of participant when training. Once training ®nishes, differentials are small but still negative. There is no evidence that participants have steeper wage pro®les. A ranking of lifetime wages suggests that the occupations chosen by participants may offer positive returns compared to occupations with no training. The largest impact comes at the ®rm level: training providers pay lower wages to both ex-participants and non-participants.
Introduction
Youth training in the United Kingdom now consistitutes a substantial part of the youth labour market.
1 For example, there were 5.5 million participants in training schemes between 1978 and 1993, representing about one-®fth of all school leavers. In 1979 one-half of all school leavers went straight from school to work; in 1992 this proportion was less than one-tenth (Andrews and Bradley, 1997, Fig. 1) . The number of participants at the end of 1995 numbered 297,000, at an exchequer cost of £2,831 per place (Robinson, 1996) and at a net cost to employers ranging from £5,200 to £10,500 depending on occupation (Keller et al., 1996) . Clearly, it is of some importance to evaluate the effectiveness of these training schemes.
In the UK a literature has developed, based almost entirely on just two datasets, namely the Youth Cohort Study of England and Wales (YCS) and the Scottish Young People's Survey (SYPS), which focuses on (at least) one of three training outcomes, namely wages, employment probabilities, and time to ®rst job. 2 The evaluation of the bene®ts of training schemes in terms of wages typically means comparing the average wages of young people who undertook some form of training (ex-participants) with the wages of those who did not (non-participants), controlling for observable characteristics. The nature of these two datasets means that waves are observed too soon after training has ®nished. Rather than compare wages at a single snap-shot in time, ideally one wants to compare lifetime wages (for which there are no suitable datasets); an important component of this analysis is the costs borne in foregone wages whilst training.
In this paper we use data from the computerised administrative records generated by Lancashire Careers Service (henceforth LCS) to examine the wages of young people who left school between 1988 and 1991. These data allow us to widen the analysis of the wage effects of training by estimating trainee wage differentials both during and after training. An important component of lifetime wages is the opportunity cost of foregone wages whilst training takes place, if training is an alternative to working rather than unemployment. More precisely, we estimate youth training wage differentials (i) on leaving school, when differentials will be negative if training allowances are lower than the wage obtained in the youth labour market, and (ii) after training has ®nished, when the differentials may start being positive. Our data also allow us to compare (iii) the growth in wages between ex-participants and non-participants, which might re¯ect differences in longer-run lifetime wage pro®les. Finally, (iv) we compare expected lifetime wages for the ®nal occupation the young person is observed in. Human capital theory predicts that participants trade off negative wage differentials during training against positive differentials after training, and also predicts higher wage growth in early labour market years.
The data we use in this paper are different from the YCS and the SYPS in a number of dimensions, and allow us to address various issues concerned with the quality and type of training. For participants in training schemes (the treatment group) we distinguish between YTS trainees and YTS employees, and for nonparticipants (the control group) we distinguish between employees with training and employees without training. 3 We analyse the effects of whether the ®rm for whom the young person works is a training provider. Because the LCS data record the duration of spells in various labour market states, we can also investigate whether time spent training, or the time since training ®nished, has any impact on the wage received after training.
We also have variables which measure young peoples' attitudes to training schemes. These are variables which might explain why a young person participates in the YTS but which do not have a direct in¯uence on his or her subsequent wages, and so are useful in modelling sample selection effects that arise when participation in the YTS is modelled endogenously. Depending on the sign of our sample selection effects, we can interpret our results as either young people choosing whether to train or not, or young people being sorted into training schemes because of a lack of alternative opportunities.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we set out the econometric framework used in the literature and our own empirical work. In Section 3 we review the existing UK literature on the wage effects of the YTS. In Section 4 we describe the Lancashire Careers Service data, and show how it can be used to estimate training differentials. Sections 5 to 8 present our results.
4 Section 9 concludes and summarises our most important ®ndings.
Methods of analysis
The econometric framework used in most of the literature and our own empirical work below can be set out in the context of the Roy model. The wage effect of a training scheme is estimated by comparing wages between a treatment group and a control group. When estimating the wage differentials during training, the treatment group comprises those young people participating in a YTS, whereas when estimating the returns to training it comprises young people who had been on a YTS before ®nding work. In both cases, the control group comprises those who have never participated in training schemes. The dummy D i takes the value unity for the treatment group and zero otherwise. The respective wage equations are " x 0 and " ! 0 are the sample means of x i and ! 0 z i for non-participants; " x 1 and " ! 1 refer to participants. The ®rst line on the right-hand side of eq. (7) is the wage differential evaluated at the sample means of non-participants, and seeks to answer the conceptual question: what would be the effect on wages, given random assignment into training, if a person who had not undertaken training in fact had, but everything else remained the same. (A similar expression is derived if the participant's differential is needed; in practice this often makes a difference.) The second line is the characteristics effect, which is non-zero if participants are different from non-participants, on average, in some observable way. The third line in eq. (7) is the bias, which can be signed if À ' 0# and ' 1# take the opposite sign. In the context of youth training, the sign of the bias can be interpreted as supporting either a sorting or choice explanation of young peoples' behaviour. The latter is a classic human capital story in so far as young people forego current earnings in choosing to participate in training schemes in the expectation of higher lifetime earnings. For some young people jobs are preferred to training, for others vice versa. If À ' 0# and ' 1# are both positive, then individuals in both jobs and training schemes are in their preferred regime and earn higher wages than under random assignment. The OLS estimates of Ew i j D i 0 and Ew i j D i 1 will both be over-estimates, and the bias will be positive for both regimes. The overall bias in the OLS wage differential ' 1# " ! 1 À À ' 0# " ! 0 cannot be signed. If À ' 0# is positive and ' 1# is negative, then only non-participants are in their preferred regime. Training schemes are perceived as having little bene®t, either in terms of current or lifetime wages. By implication participants are sorted into their regime because jobs are rationed. The non-participants' OLS wage equation will still over-estimate wages, but the participants' wage equation will under-estimate wages. The bias in the wage differential will be unambiguously negative: the OLS estimate will be too small (or too large and negative).
Intuitively, we would not expect À ' 0# to be negative, since this suggests that non-participants are in a regime which is not preferred, recalling that training scheme places are guaranteed for all 16 and 17 year olds.
It is only meaningful to refer to a negative training differential as an opportunity cost if young people have real choices between jobs and training. For some young people, especially in the sorting interpretation, the real choice is between the YTS and unemployment, in which case the term`cost' is only meaningful in an accounting sense.
It should be emphasised that this comparison between jobs and training in terms of the quality of training received is too stylised. In our empirical work we identify jobs which do have training with those which do not, and we also distinguish between two types of training scheme. The is consistent with more recent work, which has recognised that the YTS is not a homogeneous programme, and that there are a large number of ways in which a young person can acquire skills. Training is no longer represented by a simple binary dummy and so it is necessary to specify a multinomial selection model, which is estimated by the method proposed by Lee (1983) . Equation (3) is replaced by a selection equation for each of J types of training There is a growing body of evidence on the wage effects of the YTS, based mainly on the YCS and the SYPS. Main and Shelly (1990) use the SYPS whereas Whit®eld and Bourlakis (1991) , Dolton et al. (1992; 1994a) and Dolton, Gannon, and Makepeace (1998) all use the YCS. Two exceptions are Hutchinson and Church (1989) , who analyse ®rm-level survey data, and Green et al. (1996) , who use individual level data from the 1970 British Cohort Study. Because of differences in the timing of each study, the results refer to different versions of the YTS. Andrews et al. (1997) have shown that, in the context of union/non-union wage differentials, differences in methodology make it dif®cult to compare studies. Although the de®nition of the dependent variable used in all previous studies is the logarithm of the hourly wage, differences emerge between studies when one compares the form of the econometric model, the speci®cation of the control vectorÐwhich is often constrained by the datasetÐand whether participation in the YTS is treated as endogenous. Some studies treat participation as a binary choice and so estimate a binary probit model of participation (Main and Shelly, 1990) . More recent studies recognise that the YTS is not a homogeneous programme, and so specify a multinomial selection model as in eq. (8) above (Dolton et al. 1992; 1994a; Green et al. 1996) . As noted above, modelling selection raises the contentious issue of identi®cation. Only two out of six studies actually report which variables are used to proxy unobserved differences in motivation and attitudes towards training: e.g. Green et al. (1996) specify`problems at school' and attendance at independent school'.
The nature of the training effect is itself a complicated issue. Main and Shelly (1990) and Whit®eld and Bourlakis (1991) recognise that wage outcomes may be different if a young person has completed a YTS, rather than left early; the problem here is deciding what constitutes an acceptable length of time on a training scheme before a young person is counted as a participant. Nor has the literature attempted to model explicitly the relationship between the length of time spent on a YTS and the wage outcome. Participants may also secure a job with the ®rm which provides their training, rather than in the external labour market, and this may result in different wage outcomes (Main and Shelly, 1990; Whit®eld and Bourlakis, 1991) . Young people who are retained by their provider may undergo further training, and so receive lower wages, or providers may pay lower wages to participants because the wage expectations of ex-participants have been reduced.
Despite the complexity of the training effect and the variations in methodology discussed above, a number of general ®ndings arise. First, although there are differences in magnitude, almost all studies estimate negative wage differentials.
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Two exceptions are Main and Shelly (1990) , where disadvantaged young people have a large positive differential, and Dolton et al. (1992) , where males who ®nish standard YTS programmes have a small positive differential. Second, signi®cant differences in the estimates of the differential are apparent for young people who undergo apprenticeship training through the YTS. They earn substantially less than both standard YTS trainees and young people who undertake no training (Dolton et al. 1992; 1994a) . This effect probably re¯ects the time at which post-YTS wages are observed, corresponding to a period of continuing training accompanied by a lower wage. However, lifetime wages may still exceed those for young people with no training. Consequently, there is a need when modelling the wage effect of the YTS to try and estimate the slope of the wage pro®les for both treatment and control groups.
6 Third, there is some evidence that young people who obtain employment with their YTS provider earn less than their counterparts who get jobs in the external labour market. Fourth, only Dolton et al. (1992; 1994a) split their sample by gender, and ®nd that female participants in the YTS earn less than both their male counterparts and female non-participants. Finally, Dolton et al. (1998) 6 Previous US work follows a similar approach by estimating ®xed effects models (Ashenfelter, 1978; Ashenfelter and Card, 1985; Crouch, 1992) .
Using wage information in the Lancashire Careers Service data
The data we analyse are the administrative records used by the LCS, and refer to all young people who left school in Lancashire between 1988 and 1991. The LCS aims to open a record on every school leaver in Lancashire in the academic year in which they are expected to leave full-time compulsory education. It is estimated that 95% of school leavers in Lancashire have some contact with the Service (Lancashire Careers Service, 1988±92). The data cover four cohorts of school leavers in each year between 1988 and 1991. Each young person is observed as having a number of spells in one of four labour-market states, namely further education, employment, unemployment, or a youth training scheme. Duration is measured in days.
The way in which the LCS data can be used to estimate the wage effects of the YTS is illustrated in Fig. 1 . It shows the wages of two young people after leaving school until the age of 19. The ®rst young person, a participant, leaves school and starts a youth training scheme, earning an allowance y 1 for two years. On leaving the training scheme, the participant ®nds a job immediately, with a wage of y 2 . The second young person, a non-participant, leaves school at the same point in time but ®nds a job immediately, earning a wage j 1 .
For 29% of jobs, information is also recorded about advertised wage growth. Typically an increase in the wage relates to a year's tenure or to the young person's age. Thus the ®rst job the participant gets, when aged 18, is also advertised as having a wage of y 3 at age 19. Similarly, for the non-participant the ®rst job has advertised wage growth of j 3 À j 1 over the ®rst two years. Note that this information is advertised in the sense that we do not observe young people in these jobs. We assume that this is the wage that would be paid if the young person remains in the job and does not re-negotiate the wage, the latter being a realistic assumption which re¯ects the institutional nature of wage setting in the youth labour market. Of course it is possible that the young person leaves his current job for another one which pays a wage j 5 .
Fig. 1. Wage information in the LCS data
Wage differentials during and after youth training can be estimated in four ways using these data, and sometimes may be interpreted as costs or bene®ts to training.
Method A The costs of youth training are estimated by comparing the wages earned by non-participants with the allowance earned by participants. This is equivalent to comparing j 1 with y 1 in Fig. 1 . In the data, some young people may have more than one job/training scheme in the time they are observed by the Careers Service and others do not ®nd jobs/schemes immediately; here the observation refers to the young person's ®rst job/scheme after leaving school. Note that the training allowance is not the same for all participants, as employers are free to pay whatever rate they like, and treat the standard allowance as a subsidy. Also the YTS allowance is increased on participants' 17th birthday.
Method B The ®rst stage in estimating the wage bene®ts of youth training is to compare the wages of ex-participants and non-participants after training has ®nished. Again, in reality, many young people are observed with more than one job: here the observation refers to the young person's last job observed by the Careers Service, that is, we compare points like j 5 with y 2 .
Method C The second stage in estimating bene®ts is a comparison of the advertised growth in wages between ex-participants and non-participants after training has ®nished. For example, we compare y 3 À y 2 with j 2 À j 1 or j 3 À j 2 .
Method D Both methods B and C suffer from the same problem, namely that young people are observed too early in their labour market careers. A crude method for predicting lifetime earnings is to compare expected lifetime earnings based on a young person' ®nal occupation (taken from the New Earnings Survey) between participants and non-participants. This is motivated by Makepeace (1996) .
A log real hourly wage rate for points j 1 , j 5 , y 1 , and y 2 (Methods A and B) can be computed from the wage information in the LCS data. The change in the log nominal hourly wage rate, j 2 À j 1 , y 3 À y 2 , etc, (Method C) is calculated from tenure-and age-related wage information in the advertised vacancy. (Method D does not use wage information in the LCS data.) The controls are constructed from information on time-invariant personal characteristics (e.g. gender, ethnic origin, quali®cations) and from time-varying information (e.g. employment status, attitudes to training, ®rm size). Because the observations on young people refer to different points in time, to different cohorts and to different ages, we control for all three of these time elements in the regressions. Throughout the modelling process we use the same basic set of variables to control for different observable characteristics x i in the earnings equations (see Appendix 1).
The simple characterisation of the youth labour market comprising participants and non-participants ignores two important issues. First, there are two types of participant in youth training schemes: YTS employees and YTS trainees. They are quite distinct (see footnote 3), and YTS employees typically earn more, have better (apprenticeship-style) training, and are often retained when the training subsidy has been exhausted. Consequently, we split the treatment group into`YTS employees' (labelled j 2) and`YTS trainees' (labelled j 3). Second, to treat the control group as homogeneous ignores the fact many young people have jobs with some kind of training. We therefore split those in work into`employees with training' (labelled j 0) and`employees without training' (labelled j 1). A young person is coded j 0 if their occupation is either skilled manual or skilled non-manual.
Spells of employment are only recorded with a wage if the job was found using the Careers Service. Even then, only 80% of jobs have an advertised wage. Our sample therefore consists of a sub-set of the population recorded in LCS data. This has three consequences. First, for Method A, employees are under-sampled relative to participants because the Careers Service only matches one-third of all job vacancies but about 95% of all training scheme vacancies to young people. Table 1 compares the sample proportions for our four types of young person with the actual proportions observed in the whole LCS database. Second, because the Careers Service is primarily a matching service for recent school leavers, our data under-represents older employees 18 who have not yet completed longer periods of training. This means that ex-participants are under-sampled relative to non-participants for Method B. Finally, only 29% of jobs record wage growth information (Method C), and might over-represent jobs with good prospects.
In spite of the disproportionate strati®ed nature of the sample, providing observations within the sub-strata are randomly selected, this does not affect regressions estimated using OLS. However, for models with sample selection effects there is a choice-based sampling problem. We follow Maddala (1983, pp. 170±4) and Greene (1991, pp. 419±20) , and re-weight each observation's contribution to the likelihood function for the multinomial logit (eq. 8) using the actual proportions given in Table 1 .
Wage differentials during training
In this section we estimate wage differentials during training by comparing wages of those who enter YTS on leaving school with those who enter employment (Method A). If the alternative to training is work rather than unemployment, these wage differentials can be interpreted as the opportunity cost of training. Using the Roy model presented in Section 2, differentials can be computed from estimates of eq. (9), where j 0 represents employees in jobs with training, j 1 represents employees in jobs with no training, j 2 represents YTS employees, and j 3 represents YTS trainees. 7 The wage differential between group j and group k is given by 
Equation (10) is usually evaluated at average characteristics " x j and/or " x k . In addition to the controls described in Appendix 1, the data record whether the employer has provided, or is currently providing, places for the YTS. Although, by de®nition, all YTS trainees and YTS employees must be training with a YTS provider, about half of all non-participants work in a ®rm which has taken part in a YTS.
If selection into each of the four groups is exogenous to the process which determines wages, then OLS estimates are unbiased. However, it seems quite andrews ET AL. 527 possible that some unobservables which in¯uence selection also in¯uence wage determination. The perennial problem with selectivity is ®nding variables which explain the training decision, but do not affect wages directly, i.e. belong to the vector z i , but not to x i . In the LCS data there are some variables which might be considered suitable. These are summarised in Appendix 2. These comprise a dummy variable which indicates whether a young person, before leaving school, is identi®ed by the Careers Of®cer as having additional training needs. A young person was regarded as having additional training needs if, for instance, they had a criminal record, or because they had been unsuccessful in job search, or they lacked the motivation to ®nd employment. These characteristics are unobservable to employers, but imply extra funding for YTS places, and so a greater chance of participating. There is also a dummy variable`unwill' which indicates whether the initial response of the young person to the offer of a YTS place is negative. In other words, the ®rst response is`refuses', and re¯ects the attitude of the young person towards the YTS. There are also four dummy variables which record the number of job choices (1 to 4) at the time of leaving school. Young people with 3 or 4 job choices are more¯exible in their job search, and are more likely to accept any job offer in preference to a YTS place. Average hourly wages for the four groups are reported in Table 1 and plotted in Fig. 2 . There is a clear ranking of wages: employees in jobs with training earn the most, and YTS trainees earn the least. Before controlling for characteristics employees earn twice as much as YTS trainees, and about 50% more than YTS employees. Notice also that the wages of employees are more variable than those of 528 estimating youth training wage differentials YTS trainees, the latter being more variable than wages of YTS employees. Female employees earn more than male employees. This is a result of the different characteristics of males and females. Females tend to have higher quali®cations and are more likely to work in higher-paying non-manual occupations.
Because young males and females enter different occupational groups, suggesting possible gender discrimination in access to training (Green, 1991; Green, 1993; Bradley, 1995a) , we split by gender throughout. Models with and without selection are presented for both genders. On the basis of Chow tests we estimate separate wage equations (9) throughout; similarly Cramer and Ridder (1991) tests indicate that an unrestricted four-way multinomial logit is needed for modelling the selection process, eq. (8). For all regressions, we only report the effect of training variables. All differentials, eq. (10), are calculated in log-points. Our results are presented in Table 2 .
The main ®nding from the OLS results is that the ranking between the four groups observed in the raw data is preserved when controlling for observable characteristics x i . Using the average characteristics of YTS trainees " x 3 , the ranking of the four groups is shown in Table 3 . Clearly, for males, both employee groups j 0Y 1 earn almost the same, being some 0.16 log-points more than YTS employees j 2, who themselves earn 0.265 log-points more than YTS trainees j 3. For the Heckman estimates, the coef®cients on ! j z i are all insigni®cant in all four female equations. In the non-participants' equations j 0Y 1 for males they are signi®cant, implying partial correlations between the selection and wage disturbances of about unity for employees doing training and about minus unity for employees not doing training. 8 In other words, males with better unobserved characteristics are both more likely to enter jobs with training, and to earn more in those jobs. Similarly, males who enter jobs with no training have worse unobserved characteristics. This provides some evidence in favour of both the choice and sorting effects discussed in Section 2.`Better' young people choose training; in fact not from the YTS, but rather from jobs which provide training. Similarly,`worse' young people are being sorted into jobs without training. Government-funded training schemes lie somewhere in between.
The effect of sample selection on the ranking of the estimated differentials is seen in Table 3 . The highest ranking is now employees without training j 1, who earn 0.579 log-points more than YTS employees j 2, who themselves earn more than YTS trainees j 3 by 0.224 log-points. Jobs with training j 0 have fallen from the top of the ranking to the bottom, although the differential with YTS trainees is an insigni®cant 0.063 log-points. Table 4 illustrates this effect by reporting the Oaxaca decomposition (see eq. (7) 8 These estimates come with large standard errors, re¯ecting the fact that sample selection effects are not robust to changes in speci®cation. Nonetheless, the`unwill' variable is always negative and signi®cant in selection equation for a YTS j 2Y 3, both here and in Method B. Another robust effect is that the fewer the number of job choices made, the higher the probability of a YTS. with training and YTS trainees. The raw differential is 0.565 log-points in favour of j 0. When estimated by OLS, this falls to 0.425 log-points (see also Tables 2, 3 ), the rest due to observed characteristics. The estimate of the bias, when sample selection is accounted for, is, coincidentally, 0.425, reducing the differential to 0.063 log-points in favour of j 3 (see again Tables 2, 3 ). Effectively employees with training and YTS trainees are offered the same returns, but we observe employees with training earning more because of their better unobserved characteristics ' 33 0X330, Table 2 . YTS trainees earn much the same because there is no correlation ' 00 0X010 between their propensity to choose that particular outcome and the training allowance received. Most of the bias is due to the j 0 group, therefore. The most robust effect of training comes through the ®rm, not the young person. The dummy variable`provider' indicates whether or not the ®rm has provided training via the YTS, even though the young person is not on a YTS. The coef®cient on`provider' is large, negative, and signi®cant, suggesting that young people who have no contact with the YTS themselves earn considerably less if they work for a ®rm that has participated in the YTS. This is a consistent result which occurs in every wage level equation estimated in this section and the next. There are two andrews ET AL. 531 possible ways of looking at this result: either poor paying ®rms are attracted to the YTS, or that participation itself depresses wages because of the low level of allowance paid to trainees. Whilst previous work (see Section 3) has suggested that participants who continue to work for their YTS provider after completing training earn less than those who move to a different ®rm, our result is more striking. It suggests that ®rms who participate in the YTS also pay less to young people who are not on the YTS, a clear demand-side effect on wages in the youth labour market. This result cannot be due to the YTS lowering the wage expectations of participants.
To conclude this section, we have estimated the difference in wages between four types of school-leaver. Wages are measured at a point soon after school-leaving (within 12 months). Sometimes this can be characterised in terms of human capital theory as a measure of the cost of training to the school-leaver. We have shown that:
(i) For males and females, OLS estimates reveal a hierarchy of hourly wages from jobs with training (the highest), jobs without training, YTS employees and YTS trainees (the lowest). But, for males there is little difference between wages in jobs with or without training. (ii) For females, there is no evidence that selection into the four groups is jointly determined with wages. The ranking of the four regimes is preserved using sample selection methods. (iii) For males, there is evidence that`better' young persons choose jobs with training and`worse' young persons are sorted into jobs without training. Once this sample selection is controlled for, the wages of jobs with training are reduced to below those of jobs without training and YTS employees. (iv) Working for a training provider lowers wages by about one-quarter.
The impact of training on post-training wage levels
In this section we compare the wages of participants and non-participants after participants have ®nished their training (Method B). This is the standard way of assessing the impact of training on wages using cross-section data. As in Section 5 all estimation is split by gender, and non-participants are divided into those who are in jobs with training, j 0, and those in jobs which offer no training, j 1. The sample contains only 119 ex-YTS employees and 585 ex-YTS trainees, and we therefore group these categories together, j 2, 3 (Table 1 ). The control vectors x i , z i are very similar to those used in the previous section (see Appendices 1 and 2). To allow comparison with the existing literature, we also present estimates of a socalled base model, which restricts eq. (1) to
where is the wage differential between non-participants j 0Y 1 and ex-participants j 2Y 3.
In Section 5 three types of YTS effect were identi®ed. These were wage differentials for (i) YTS trainees (ii) YTS employees, and (iii) those working for a YTS provider. In this section, because wage equations are estimated after training schemes have ®nished, two additional YTS effects can be investigated for ex-YTS participants: (iv) the time spent on the training programme (`yttime', sample mean is 8.4 months), and (v) the time since the training programme ®nished (`tsyt1' is less than six months, sample mean 0.296;`tyst2' is more than six months, sample mean 0.129; and the base is no time at all). Table 5 reports estimates of (9).
We follow precisely the same methods used in Section 5. Once again, the coef®cients on ! j z i are insigni®cant for females, and their introduction into the wage equations has little impact on the size of the estimated differentials. However, the introduction of the sample selection terms increases the size of the estimated standard errors on wage differentials, rendering them all insigni®cant at the 5% level.
For males, we ®nd that the coef®cient on ! j z i is large and positive for employees with training j 0, and is insigni®cant for the other two groups. The differentials between j 0 and either of the other two groups therefore increase and become positive. As with females, however, the standard errors on these differentials are much higher than in the OLS case, and all differentials are insigni®cant at the 5% level.
Signs and signi®cance levels on other coef®cients are the same whether or not sample selection effects are modelled. For all three groups the coef®cient on`provider' is about minus one-quarter, an identical estimate to that in the previous section. However, whereas YTS employees earn considerably more than YTS trainees whilst on a training programme, this effect does not continue once the programme has been completed. The coef®cient on`ytse' for females is positive and signi®cant at 12%, whereas for males it is negative and insigni®cant, which may re¯ect the fact that all YTS completers engage in a period of further training which is paid at a similar level. Also, if this wage is greater than that obtained by exparticipants who left the YTS early, then we would expect to ®nd evidence of positive returns to the length of time spent on the YTS. There is limited support for this hypothesis: the coef®cient on`yttime' is positive and signi®cant but only for males. A stronger effect on wages comes from`tsyt2', the length of time since training ®nished. Females who ®nished their scheme more than six months before their current job started earn 0.159 log-points more; males earn 0.288 log-points more. Our ®nding on`tsyt2' could be interpreted as evidence that employers in the external labour market do value the skills acquired on the YTS.
Estimates of the overall differential between ex-YTS participants and nonparticipants are also given in Table 5 . We ®nd that females who entered a job with training earn between 0.065 and 0.174 log-points more than a similar young person who entered a YTS. However, the wage differential between ex-YTS participants and employees in (unskilled) jobs with no training is insigni®cantly different from zero. It has been argued that a fair comparison between ex-YTS participants and non-participants should focus on less able young people (Main and Shelly, 1990 ). If we equate`less able' with young people in unskilled jobs, we ®nd no evidence that a YTS either improves or reduces wages. A similar picture emerges for males. The size of the overall YTS effect is therefore small compared to other in¯uences on the wage, especially whether the employer provides YTS places and ®rm size (not reported). However, the size of the YTS effect varies widely between different types of participants. For example, a male ex-participant who works for a ®rm that has never provided training through the YTS, and who entered a job more than six months after ®nishing the scheme, earns on average 50% more than a participant who works for a provider and who entered a job immediately on ®nishing the scheme (0.288 0.250). Therefore, although the overall YTS effect is negative (albeit often insigni®cant), this disguises a wide variation in wage outcomes which would be lost in a framework which only allowed for a single YTS dummy variable. This is precisely what the base model (eq. 11) estimates. The dummy variable anyyts corresponds to D i . The simple result is that ex-participants earn less than non-participants, more so for females (À0.111) than males (À0.027). This is consistent with estimates from other studies, as discussed in Section 3.
The results in this section are less clear-cut than for our estimates of wage differentials during training presented earlier, partly because the latter tend to be so large. Nevertheless, we are able to con®rm the results of previous research, and also add some new ®ndings of our own: (i) the wage returns to YTS are generally small and often negative; (ii) there are signi®cant differences in outcome depending on the time at which the wage is measured. The later the wage is measured, the higher the wage even after controlling for age and time; (iii) working for a training provider has a consistent impact of minus one-quarter; (iv) the evidence for the existence of sample selection problems is mixed.
The estimated covariances between the wage equation and the participation equation are all insigni®cant for women, and signi®cant for only one male group. The standard errors on training differentials increase. There is little impact on other dimensions of training.
The impact of training on post-training wage growth
The third method we use to assess the impact of training is to compare the advertised wage growth of ex-participants and non-participants (Method C). For 29% of the observations analysed in the previous section the wage data includes information about how the wage will change through time, provided that the young person stays in the same job and does not re-negotiate the wage. In most cases this takes the form of a set of age-related payments. Thus if a young person is 17 when they start a job, we know that they will receive the wage accruing to an 18-year old beginning at their next birthday. For a few cases the information is in the form of a set of tenure-related payments, which tell us how much a young person will get one, two or three years after starting. Both age-and tenure-related wage information is converted into a common format, so that for each observation we have a set of log wages w it , where the t subscript refers to`personal' years. More precisely, w it refers to the wage that young person i will get t years after the job started.
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The motivation for this analysis is to investigate whether wage pro®les differ between participants and non-participants. Because of the limited amount of information available, various restrictions are imposed. First, it was not feasible to split the sample and estimate separate equations for all four categories, and so we group the two YTS categories j 2Y 3 together. Our model is therefore:
YTS is the base, D Third, the controls used were a subset of x i which included only the most signi®-cant elements. Fourth, of the extra dimensions of training available, only`provider' is included.
In Table 6 we report estimates of eqs (12). Obviously, if we were to impose 1 we have a wage growth equation; however, the parameter on w itÀ1 in (12) is signi®cantly different from zero. Moreover, the OLS estimate of is biased upwards (Lee et al., 1995) suggesting that there is considerable long-run information contained in the data. We therefore prefer to interpret the effects of`provider', and so on in eq. (12) is insigni®cant, effectively j 0Y 2Y 3 can be grouped together, with employees without training j 1 having a higher growth rate of 0.031. This suggests that trainees (in jobs or schemes) do not have higher rates of growth in wages to compensate lower starting wages, in contrast to the classic human capital hypothesis. The equivalent differentials for women are that employees with training have a growth rate of 0.010 (À0.015 0.005) log-points less than both YTS categories (whose p-value is 0.386), but employees without training have a growth rate of 0.019 (0X031 À 0X012; p-value of 0.104) log-points more than both YTS categories. These results are similar to men, but weaker; the p-values above imply that differentials for women are insigni®cantly different from zero. Finally, notice that Method C is the only method where the impact of`provider' is not signi®cantly negative.
To conclude this section, there are two main ®ndings: (i) there are negative training differentials in the growth of wages, relative to employees without training. These estimates are insigni®cant for women, however; and (ii) the effect of provider is zero.
The impact of training on expected lifetime wages
In this section, we investigate the effect of training on expected lifetime wages by using the ®nal occupation each young person is observed in (Method D). To each of 75 3-digit occupation codes we associated average wages from the 1996 New Earnings Survey, and used this as the dependent variable in otherwise similar equations to those reported in Method B. Because every young person in the LCS can now be used, our sample sizes are much larger. The results are presented in Table 7 and are very similar across gender.
The`lifetime' differentials make some sense. Employees with training j 0 earn the most, some 0.067 log-points more than ex-YTS employees j 2, who earn 0.043 log-points more than ex-YTS trainees j 3. Employees without training j 1 are bottom of the ranking, earning 0.143 log-points less than ex-YTS trainees. This result suggests that occupations which ex-participants are in some three to four years after leaving school are not as badly paying (in terms of expected life-time wages) as occupations which offer little or no training.
There is one conclusion to this section: using`lifetime' wages associated with the last occupation each young person is observed in, employees with training should expect to earn the most, followed by ex-YTS employees, ex-YTS trainees and employees without training. This ranking is consistent with the quality of the training received.
Summary and conclusions
This paper attempts to evaluate the effectiveness or otherwise of youth training schemes in Britain using data from the computerised administrative records generated by Lancashire Careers Service to examine the wages of young people who left school between 1988 and 1991. We estimate training differentials on leaving school (Method A) and after training has ®nished (Methods B, C, and D).
Because our data are different from the existing literature, this paper examines various issues that have not been addressed by most studies to date. These are: (i) wage differentials during training; (ii) different types of training (YTS employees, training when not on a YTS and whether the ®rm is a provider); (iii) the interpretation of sample selection effects: choice versus sorting; (iv) the duration of training and the time since training ®nished to ®rst job; and ®nally (v) wage growth. Choice-based sampling techniques are used to deal with the non-representative nature of data, arising from the way they are collected.
To illustrate some of our ®ndings, Table 8 summarises male OLS differentials from all four methods. Figure 3 is a schematic representation of these results (excluding Method C), where the distances between the pro®les at each dotted line are proportional to the estimated differentials.
The wages offered by`jobs without training' j 1 drop from ®rst equal for Method A to last for Method D. Compared with the two YTS categories j 2Y 3, 538 estimating youth training wage differentials this is consistent with a human capital story. On the other hand, employees with training always do best unless we control for sample selection effects, in which case we ®nd evidence that school-leavers who enter jobs with training are paying in the sense of foregone wages. However, this analysis ignores our direct estimates of wage growth differentials from Method C. Ideally these differentials should be consistent with Methods A, B, and D; this cannot be established either way because employees with and without training were grouped together, as were YTS trainees and YTS employees. For this reason, and because the sample sizes are much smaller, Method C results are perhaps the least convincing in this paper. To conclude, our most important ®ndings are as follows:
(i) Trainee wage differentials during training are large and negative. There is a clear ranking: employees with training, employees without training, YTS employees, YTS trainees. Employees with training fall to the bottom of the ranking when sample selection effects are modelled (males only);
andrews ET AL. 539 { Constrained equal to zero by model speci®cation.
(ii) Providers pay less. It matters less whether the young person has done any training but more whether the current employer is a training provider: providers pay lower wages (by about one-quarter) compared with ®rms who do not participate in the YTS. The effect is very robust in all wagelevel regressions estimated in this research. Clearly, employers have done very well out of the YTS: not only do they get subsidies for training and/or employing young people, but also their wage costs are substantially lower.
